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US Chip Export Controls and the China AI Rivalry · history

Version 10

2026-05-30 09:01 UTC · 428 items

What

The US-China AI chip confrontation is now defined by four simultaneous contradictions: the Trump administration's commercial accommodation (licensed H200 sales to ten Chinese firms with a 15% revenue-sharing deal) [4][6][7]; a bipartisan congressional enforcement push including the unanimously passed Stop Stealing Our Chips Act [10]; a civil war within American technology between Nvidia/AMD lobbying for relaxation and Anthropic lobbying Congress for restriction [31][22]; and a Huawei-led domestic Chinese ecosystem projecting 50–60% AI chip market share [33] while SMIC tests domestic DUV lithography [40][42]. Jensen Huang has become the thread connecting all four: he accepted the revenue-sharing deal [4], committed $150 billion per year to Taiwan manufacturing [23], accepted an advisory role on Tsinghua University's elite business school board while Washington blocks Nvidia's most advanced chips from China [24], and publicly stated that blocking Nvidia does not block China from AI [21].

Why it matters

The 15% revenue deal generates federal revenue without reducing Chinese AI compute capacity, while Huawei's market acceleration and SMIC's lithography progress push toward a threshold at which US licensing decisions become structurally irrelevant. SemiAnalysis's observation that AMD and Nvidia's most productive engineers are concentrated in Shanghai [43] introduces a human-capital dimension that hardware-focused export control frameworks haven't addressed — and that the industry civil war between Anthropic and Nvidia has entirely ignored.

Open questions

  • Huang accepted an advisory role on Tsinghua SEM's 65-member board while Washington blocks Nvidia's most advanced chips from China [24] — will this trigger CFIUS review, regulatory scrutiny, or any response from the administration that just structured a revenue-sharing deal with him?

  • SemiAnalysis reports AMD and Nvidia's best engineers are in Shanghai, including AMD's MoRI collective and disaggregated applications teams [43][44] — does this talent geography constitute a technology transfer vulnerability that hardware-focused export controls structurally cannot address?

  • SMIC's domestic DUV capability is reported by different sources as ranging from 28nm to 7nm [40][41][42] — which claim is accurate, and at what production threshold does domestic manufacturing make US export licensing decisions irrelevant regardless of direction?

  • The Stop Stealing Our Chips Act passed the Senate unanimously [10] and requires a presidential signature — will the president sign enforcement legislation targeting the same companies with whom his administration has active revenue-sharing and licensing arrangements?

Narrative

The US government's semiconductor export control framework has entered a phase of institutional contradiction between the executive and legislative branches. The Trump administration reversed Biden-era restrictions by approving licensed H200 chip sales to approximately ten Chinese companies including Alibaba, ByteDance, and Tencent [1][2][3], and structured a 15% revenue-sharing arrangement under which Nvidia and AMD remit a portion of China chip sales revenues to the US government [4][5][6][7] — confirmed by multiple sources but not yet finalized as of late May 2026 [8]. The Bureau of Industry and Security adopted case-by-case review for H200 and AMD's MI325X chip sales to China [9]. Congress responded across multiple fronts: the Senate unanimously passed the Stop Stealing Our Chips Act creating 10–30% whistleblower bounties [10]; the bipartisan MATCH Act was introduced in both chambers [11][12]; Representative Baumgartner introduced chipmaking equipment controls legislation [13]; and the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a markup on export control legislation [14][15].

The commercial stakes are large and Jensen Huang's posture now embodies the full set of contradictions. Nvidia took a $4.5 billion Q1 charge from H20 export restrictions [16][17] and warned of an $8 billion Q2 revenue impact [18]. Huang acknowledged Huawei chips are "comparable" to the H200, that Nvidia has "largely conceded" China's AI chip market [19][20], and that blocking Nvidia from China does not block China from AI [21]. He lobbied Trump directly [22] and accepted the 15% revenue-sharing arrangement [4]. He then committed $150 billion per year to Taiwan as the irreplaceable center of AI chip manufacturing, packaging, and systems assembly — directly contradicting Trump's push to make the US the hub of AI manufacturing [23] — while simultaneously accepting an advisory role on Tsinghua University's elite School of Economics and Management board, deepening Nvidia's ties with China's business and policy networks at the precise moment Washington restricts its most advanced products from China [24]. AMD CEO Lisa Su confirmed China accounts for approximately 20% of AMD revenue [25], obtained export licenses [26], and warned against strict controls [27]. Opposing both semiconductor companies, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei called Trump's chip reversal "crazy" [28], compared chip sales to "selling nuclear weapons" [29], argued chips are "the only advantage we have" over China [30], and conducted a congressional "Hill blitz" [31].

Huawei's domestic chip program has reached a scale that makes hardware export controls increasingly difficult to justify on strategic grounds. Multiple sources project Huawei will capture 50–60% of China's AI chip market in 2026 [32][33], targeting $12 billion in revenue — a 60% year-on-year jump [34][35] — while planning to double Ascend output to 1.6 million dies [36]. The Ascend 910C delivers approximately 60% of Nvidia H100 inference performance [37], and the 950PR is reported to outperform the H20 entirely [38]. ByteDance holds a US H200 license while simultaneously ordering $5.7 billion in Huawei chips [39], a dual-supply-chain strategy now structural across Chinese tech. SMIC has confirmed testing of domestic DUV lithography equipment [40][41][42] — with reports diverging on the node achieved, ranging from 28nm to 7nm — adding milestones to China's trajectory toward semiconductor manufacturing self-sufficiency. SemiAnalysis identifies a human-capital dimension almost entirely absent from the policy debate: AMD and Nvidia's most productive engineers are concentrated in Shanghai, including AMD's MoRI collective communications team and disaggregated applications engineering team [43][44] — a talent geography that hardware-focused export control frameworks haven't engaged with.

The Taiwan arms sale remains paused. Trump made no commitment to defend Taiwan at the Beijing summit [45], Taiwan was not officially notified of the pause [46], the Iran-inventory rationale offered by the Acting Navy Secretary is disputed by a Reuters source [47], and Taiwan is actively lobbying for the deal to proceed [48]. Nvidia's $150 billion per year Taiwan manufacturing commitment [23] underscores the island's commercial irreplaceability to AI supply chains — a fact that sits alongside the paused arms deal as an unresolved geopolitical variable. SemiAnalysis has noted that Intel operates a complete Xeon supply chain that never touches Taiwan, with compute tiles in Ireland and Arizona, IO tiles in Israel and Arizona, and advanced packaging in New Mexico [49] — a counter-example that complicates the prevailing assumption that all advanced chip production is Taiwan-dependent.

Timeline

  • 2026-01-20: Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei slams Trump's decision to sell advanced AI chips to China as 'crazy' and publishes a formal policy argument on DeepSeek and export controls. [28][50]
  • 2026-02-10: Axios reports Anthropic CEO conducted a 'Hill blitz' congressional lobbying campaign to boost a China chip ban. [31]
  • 2026-04-02: Representative Baumgartner introduces a bipartisan bill to tighten US controls on sensitive chipmaking equipment. [13]
  • 2026-04-08: Senators Risch, Ricketts, and Kim introduce the bipartisan MATCH Act to align multilateral technology controls on hardware in both chambers. [11][12]
  • 2026-04-22: House Foreign Affairs Committee holds a markup on export control legislation protecting American technology. [14][15]
  • 2026-05-14: The US government clears H200 chip sales to approximately ten Chinese companies including Alibaba, ByteDance, and Tencent. [62][2][3]
  • 2026-05-16: Following Beijing talks with Xi, Trump warns Taiwan against formal independence and reportedly makes no commitment to defend the island. [63][45][64][65]
  • 2026-05-21: Jensen Huang tells CNBC Nvidia has 'largely conceded' China's AI chip market to Huawei; US Senate unanimously passes Stop Stealing Our Chips Act. [19][20][10][53][54]
  • 2026-05-22: Huang meets directly with Trump; reports emerge of 15% revenue-sharing deal; Acting Navy Secretary confirms Taiwan arms sale paused citing Iran inventory. [22][4][5][52][66][67]
  • 2026-05-23: Reuters source contradicts Iran rationale for Taiwan arms pause; ByteDance confirmed ordering $5.7B in Huawei chips; AMD confirms ~20% China revenue and export licenses; Huawei 950PR reported to outperform H20. [47][39][25][26][38]
  • 2026-05-24: Nvidia reports $4.5B Q1 charge and warns of $8B Q2 revenue hit; BIS shifts to case-by-case H200/MI325X review; 15% deal confirmed not yet finalized; Huawei targeting $12B AI chip revenue. [16][17][18][9][8][68]
  • 2026-05-25: Taiwan urges Trump to advance the paused $14B arms deal; Huawei confirmed planning to double Ascend output to 1.6 million dies; Huang states blocking Nvidia does not block China from AI. [48][36][21]
  • 2026-05-26: Multiple outlets confirm 15% revenue-sharing deal structure; multiple independent sources confirm SMIC testing domestic DUV lithography with reported capability ranging from 28nm to 7nm; Huawei 60% revenue jump confirmed. [6][69][7][40][41][42][34][35]
  • 2026-05-27: Nvidia commits $150 billion per year to Taiwan as the center of AI chip manufacturing, directly contradicting Trump's push to make the US the hub of AI production. [23]
  • 2026-05-28: Huang accepts an advisory role on Tsinghua University's SEM board, deepening Nvidia's ties with China's elite business and policy networks while Washington restricts its most advanced chips from China. [24]
  • 2026-05-29: SemiAnalysis reports AMD and Nvidia's most productive engineers are concentrated in Shanghai, including AMD's MoRI collective and disaggregated applications teams; Intel's Taiwan-free Xeon supply chain noted as counter-example to Taiwan-dependency narrative. [43][44][49]

Perspectives

Jensen Huang / Nvidia

Controls have backfired commercially: Nvidia has 'largely conceded' China's AI chip market to Huawei [19][20], blocking Nvidia does not block China from AI [21], and facing a $4.5B Q1 charge [16], Huang accepted the 15% revenue-sharing deal [4] and lobbied Trump directly [22].

Evolution: Two new contradictions deepen his posture: a $150B/year Taiwan manufacturing commitment that undermines Trump's US manufacturing push [23], and an advisory role on Tsinghua SEM's board that ties Nvidia to China's elite networks while Washington restricts its most advanced products [24].

[19][20][16][18][22][4][21][23][24]

Dario Amodei / Anthropic

Strongly and actively opposed to US chip exports to China: called Trump's reversal 'crazy' [28], compared chip sales to 'selling nuclear weapons' [29], argued chips are 'the only advantage we have' over China [30], and conducted a congressional 'Hill blitz' [31].

Evolution: Consistent. Represents the most prominent AI model company voice directly opposing the semiconductor companies, lobbying Congress while Nvidia and AMD lobby the White House.

[29][50][30][28][31]

AMD / Lisa Su

China accounts for ~20% of AMD revenue [25], AMD holds export licenses [26], and Su warned against strict controls [27] while reporting progress with the US government on easing restrictions.

Evolution: Consistent. SemiAnalysis's report that AMD's top engineering teams are in Shanghai [43] adds an unremarked structural dimension to AMD's China entanglement.

[51][27][25][26][43]

Trump administration / BIS

Approved licensed H200 sales to ten Chinese firms [2][3], adopted BIS case-by-case review for H200 and MI325X [9], and structured a 15% revenue-sharing deal under which Nvidia and AMD remit a portion of China chip sales to the government [4][5][6][7]. Confirmed the Taiwan arms sale pause; the Iran-inventory rationale is publicly disputed [47].

Evolution: Consistent. The 15% deal is confirmed by multiple outlets [6][7] though finalization remains pending [8].

[4][5][8][9][52][47][6][7]

US Senate and Congress (bipartisan)

Senate unanimously passed the Stop Stealing Our Chips Act [10]; the bipartisan MATCH Act was introduced in both chambers [11][12]; Baumgartner introduced chipmaking equipment controls [13]; House Foreign Affairs Committee held a markup [14][15].

Evolution: Consistent. Congressional enforcement activity spans both chambers across multiple enforcement vehicles simultaneously, operating in tension with executive branch licensing approvals.

[10][53][54][14][13][11][15][12]

Huawei / Chinese tech ecosystem (as actors)

Projecting 50–60% of China's AI chip market in 2026 [33] with $12B revenue target reflecting 60% year-on-year growth [34][35], doubling Ascend output to 1.6 million dies [36], and 950PR outperforming H20 [38]; ByteDance holds H200 licenses while ordering $5.7B in Huawei chips [39].

Evolution: SMIC testing domestic DUV lithography at reported capability from 28nm to 7nm [40][41][42] adds a supply-chain self-sufficiency dimension beyond chip production volume.

[33][34][35][36][38][39][40][41][42]

Taiwan government

President Lai insists Taiwan's future will not be decided by external forces [55]; Taiwan was not officially notified of the arms sale pause [46] and is actively lobbying for the deal to proceed [48] while fearing the pause weakens its defenses [56].

Evolution: Consistent. Nvidia's $150B/year Taiwan manufacturing commitment [23] underscores the island's commercial irreplaceability even as US arms sales remain paused.

[55][46][57][56][48][23]

CFR / Brookings / IFP / SemiAnalysis (analytical voices)

CFR: Trump's AI chip policy is 'strategically incoherent and unenforceable' [58] but Huawei cannot catch Nvidia [59]. Brookings: Trump's Taiwan approach is a 'dangerous gamble' [60]. SemiAnalysis: AMD and Nvidia's best engineers are in Shanghai [43], and Intel's Taiwan-free Xeon supply chain challenges the assumption that all advanced chip production depends on Taiwan [49].

Evolution: CFR's 'Huawei cannot catch Nvidia' claim [59] remains in direct factual tension with Huang's own parity acknowledgment [19] and Huawei's 60% revenue jump [34]. SemiAnalysis enters as a new analytical voice with specific hardware and talent claims.

[58][59][60][61][43][49]

Tensions

  • Dario Amodei / Anthropic vs. Jensen Huang / Nvidia on chip exports: Amodei conducts an active congressional lobbying campaign against chip sales — calling Trump's reversal 'crazy' and comparing it to 'selling nuclear weapons' [29][28][31] — while Huang lobbies the White House for relaxation [22] and AMD's Su obtained export licenses [26], with each side pressing the branch most receptive. [29][28][31][22][26]
  • Trump administration vs. Congress: the White House approved licensed H200 sales and structured a 15% revenue-sharing deal [4][7] while the Senate unanimously passed whistleblower enforcement legislation [10] and the House advances multiple enforcement bills [14][13] — with the same president being lobbied by Nvidia for further relaxation [22]. [4][7][10][14][13][22]
  • Jensen Huang vs. CFR on Huawei chip capability: Huang states Huawei chips are 'comparable' to the H200, that Nvidia has 'largely conceded' China's market [19][20], and that blocking Nvidia does not block China from AI [21], while CFR argues Huawei cannot catch Nvidia [59] — a dispute compounded by Huawei's 60% revenue jump [34][35] and 50–60% market share projections [33]. [19][20][59][21][34][35][33]
  • Nvidia's $150B Taiwan commitment vs. Trump's US manufacturing push: Huang announced $150 billion per year in Taiwan investment and declared Taiwan the center of AI chip manufacturing, packaging, and systems assembly [23] — directly contradicting the Trump administration's policy goal of making the US the hub of AI production. [23]
  • Huang accepting Tsinghua advisory board vs. Washington's chip restrictions: Huang joined Tsinghua SEM's 65-member advisory board, deepening Nvidia's ties with China's elite business and policy networks [24], while simultaneously negotiating a 15% revenue-sharing deal with the US government [4] — a juxtaposition that has drawn no reported regulatory response. [24][4]
  • US export control hardware logic vs. Shanghai talent concentration: export control frameworks restrict hardware flows to China, but SemiAnalysis reports AMD and Nvidia's most productive engineers — including the MoRI collective communications team and disaggregated applications engineering team — are concentrated in Shanghai [43][44], suggesting the most critical design knowledge already resides in China regardless of hardware licensing decisions. [43][44]

Sources

  1. [1] Nvidia H200 China Sales: 75K Cap + 25% Tax [April 2026] — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  2. [2] The US Commerce Department has approved around 10 Chinese ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  3. [3] China gives nod to ByteDance, Alibaba and Tencent to buy Nvidia's ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  4. [4] Nvidia and AMD to pay 15% of China chip sales to US - BBC — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  5. [5] Nvidia, AMD to Give U.S. 15% Cut on AI Chip Sales to China - WSJ — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  6. [6] Inside the U.S. Government’s Bold Revenue-Sharing Deal With Chipmakers Nvidia & AMD - Z2Data — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  7. [7] U.S. Government to Take Cut of Nvidia and AMD A.I. Chip Sales to ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  8. [8] Nvidia still hasn't finalized deal to kick 15% of H20 China chip sales ... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  9. [9] BIS Export Policy Shift | Introl Blog — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  10. [10] Senate Unanimously Passes Stop Stealing Our Chips Act - Digg — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  11. [11] [2026-04-08] Risch, Ricketts, Kim Introduce MATCH Act; Level the... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  12. [12] Senators Kim and Ricketts Introduce MATCH Act to Level the Global Playing Field for U.S. Tech - Senator Andy Kim — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  13. [13] Baumgartner Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Tighten Controls on ... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  14. [14] Support Export Control Legislation at HFAC Markup (April 22) — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  15. [15] House Committee Passes Legislation Protecting American ... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  16. [16] Nvidia takes $4.5bn hit due to export restrictions | Computer Weekly — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  17. [17] NVIDIA Posts $4.5B Q1 Charge Over US Export Restrictions — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  18. [18] Nvidia beats on Q1 revenue, warns of $8 billion sales hit in Q2 from ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  19. [19] Nvidia CEO says that Huawei's chip is comparable to Nvidia's H200. : r/LocalLLaMA — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  20. [20] Nvidia says it has 'largely conceded' China's AI chip market to Huawei — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  21. [21] Jensen Huang explains how blocking China from Nvidia does not mean blocking China from AI. — Rohan Paul Twitter (2026-05-25)
  22. [22] Nvidia CEO meets with Trump, talks export controls - The Hill — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  23. [23] Nvidia bets $150B on Taiwan as Trump's plan to make US an AI hub backfires — Ars Technica AI (2026-05-27)
  24. [24] Jensen Huang just moved Nvidia closer to China’s elite business and policy network by accepting the coveted Tsinghua Uni… — Rohan Paul Twitter (2026-05-28)
  25. [25] AMD CEO Lisa Su says China still accounts for about 20 ... - Reddit — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  26. [26] #TECH: AMD CEO Lisa Su confirmed Thursday that the ... - Facebook — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  27. [27] AMD CEO Lisa Su warns against strict U.S. chip controls — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  28. [28] Anthropic boss Dario Amodei slams Trump over 'crazy' decision to ... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  29. [29] Trump Just Reversed an AI Chip Ban for China—and a Key Tech Leader Says It’s Like ‘Selling Nuclear Weapons’ — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  30. [30] Chips may be 'only advantage we have' over China, Amodei says — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  31. [31] Anthropic CEO's Hill blitz boosts China chip ban - Axios — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  32. [32] Huawei to own 50% of Chinese AI chip market by 2026: Report - Huawei Central — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  33. [33] Huawei Is The Biggest Winner In China's AI Market After NVIDIA Pullout, AI Share To Reach 60% This Year — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  34. [34] Huawei expects AI chip revenue to jump at least 60% this year, FT reports — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  35. [35] Huawei expects AI chip sales to surge at least 60% in 2026: report — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  36. [36] Huawei to double AI chip output in 2026, targeting 1.6 million dies — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  37. [37] DeepSeek research suggests Huawei's Ascend 910C delivers 60 ... — reactive:china-ai-rising
  38. [38] Huawei's Ascend 950PR outperforms Nvidia's H20 in China — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  39. [39] ByteDance to order $5.7 billion Huawei AI chips over Nvidia in 2026 — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  40. [40] China Tests Domestic DUV Lithography Machine for 28nm Chips — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  41. [41] SMIC initiates testing of domestically produced lithography machines to bypass US sanctions — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  42. [42] China's SMIC Begins Trial Operation of 7nm DUV Equipment ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  43. [43] Most of AMD and NVIDIA’s best 10x engineers are in Shanghai. AMD’s MoRI collective team, AMD’s disaggregated application… — SemiAnalysis Twitter (2026-05-29)
  44. [44] The most of AMD & NVIDIA's best 10x AMD engineers are in Shanghai. AMD's MoRI collective team, AMD disagg applicatio… — SemiAnalysis Twitter (2026-05-29)
  45. [45] Trump's "no commitment" on Taiwan post-China redefines strategic ambiguity as a transactional lever. This immediately re... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics (2026-05-16)
  46. [46] Taiwan says US hasn't notified it of any pause in arms sale - AP News — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  47. [47] US arms sales to Taiwan unrelated to Iran war, source says | Reuters — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  48. [48] Taiwan urges Trump to advance arms deal after China summit — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  49. [49] Chip supply chain talk defaults to Taiwan. Intel runs an entire parallel chain that never touches the island. — SemiAnalysis Twitter (2026-05-29)
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  51. [51] AMD CEO Making Progress with US on China Export Restrictions (Full Interview) — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  52. [52] US pausing $14B arms sale to Taiwan due to Iran war: Acting Navy secretary — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  53. [53] US Senate passes Stop Stealing our Chips Act to curb semiconductor smuggling to China — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics (2026-05-23)
  54. [54] RT @AIpolicynetwork: The Senate unanimously passed the Stop Stealing Our Chips Act last night. Thank you @MarkWarner and... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics (2026-05-22)
  55. [55] 🇹🇼 Taiwan's President Lai: 'Future will NOT be decided by external forces' — amid China-US headwinds — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics (2026-05-20)
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  57. [57] Eager for Arms Deal, Taiwan Stresses Need for U.S. Support — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  58. [58] The New AI Chip Export Policy to China: Strategically Incoherent ... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
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  61. [61] DeepSeek shows the limits of US export controls on AI chips | Brookings — reactive:ai-chip-geopolitics
  62. [62] US clears H200 chip sales to 10 China firms as Nvidia CEO looks for ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  63. [63] Trump warns Taiwan against formal independence after talks with Xi in Beijing. — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics (2026-05-16)
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  65. [65] Trump Makes a High Risk Move to Win Over Xi — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
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  67. [67] Acting Navy secretary: Taiwan weapons sales paused to ... - The Hill — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  68. [68] Huawei expects AI chip revenue to jump at least 60% this year, FT reports — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
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