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US Chip Export Controls and the China AI Rivalry · history

Version 11

2026-05-31 18:39 UTC · 439 items

What

The US-China AI chip confrontation has reached a threshold where China's technology leaders are publicly declaring US export controls a strategic failure — and hardware benchmarks are beginning to support that claim. Huawei chairman Xu Zhijun publicly thanked Washington for sanctions as a 'gift' that built China's semiconductor self-sufficiency [24]; SemiAnalysis reports Huawei's 2026 Kirin chips have achieved 1.5µm bond pitch hybrid bonding — multiple generations ahead of TSMC's 6µm [25]; and ByteDance is now developing its own AI data-center CPUs testing Arm and RISC-V architectures alongside its dual GPU supply chain [29][28]. Jensen Huang remains the story's central contradiction: a Tsinghua board member [19], a $150B/year Taiwan investor who denies US aims to shift existing Taiwan capacity to America [17][18], and a partner in a 15% revenue-sharing deal [4] that the unanimously passed Stop Stealing Our Chips Act would complicate [8].

Why it matters

Huawei's reported hybrid bonding lead over TSMC — if accurate — represents a category inversion: the company US export controls were designed to suppress has achieved world leadership in a specific advanced packaging technology. Combined with Xu Zhijun's public 'thank you,' Huawei's 60% revenue surge, and ByteDance's custom silicon program, the 'sanctions as accelerant' thesis has moved from theoretical to empirically supported, placing the entire US export control framework under mounting strategic doubt.

Open questions

  • SemiAnalysis claims Huawei's 2026 Kirin chips achieve 1.5µm bond pitch hybrid bonding ahead of TSMC's 6µm, with 2027 chips targeting 1µm [25] — has this been independently verified, and if accurate, does it represent a durable manufacturing lead or a one-cycle anomaly?

  • ByteDance is testing Arm and RISC-V for custom AI data-center CPUs [29] while simultaneously holding US H200 licenses and ordering $5.7B in Huawei chips [28] — does this trajectory toward full silicon vertical integration represent a template that Alibaba and Tencent will replicate?

  • Huang accepted a Tsinghua SEM board seat [19], denied US policy aims to shift 40% of Taiwan's chipmaking to America [18], and holds a 15% revenue-sharing deal still awaiting finalization [6] — will any of these positions trigger formal regulatory review?

  • The Stop Stealing Our Chips Act passed the Senate unanimously [8] and requires a presidential signature — will the president sign enforcement legislation targeting companies with whom his administration holds active revenue-sharing and licensing arrangements?

Narrative

The US government's semiconductor export control framework has entered a phase of institutional contradiction between the executive and legislative branches. The Trump administration reversed Biden-era restrictions by approving licensed H200 chip sales to approximately ten Chinese companies including Alibaba, ByteDance, and Tencent [1][2], and structured a 15% revenue-sharing arrangement under which Nvidia and AMD remit a portion of China chip sales revenues to the US government [3][4][5] — confirmed by multiple outlets but not finalized as of late May 2026 [6]. The Bureau of Industry and Security adopted case-by-case review for H200 and AMD MI325X chip sales to China [7]. Congress responded with the Senate unanimously passing the Stop Stealing Our Chips Act creating 10–30% whistleblower bounties [8], while both chambers advanced the bipartisan MATCH Act [9] and the House moved equipment control legislation [10].

Jensen Huang has become the central figure connecting the story's contradictions. Nvidia took a $4.5 billion Q1 charge from H20 export restrictions [11] and warned of an $8 billion Q2 revenue impact [12]. Huang acknowledged Huawei chips are 'comparable' to the H200, that Nvidia has 'largely conceded' China's AI chip market [13][14], and that blocking Nvidia does not block China from AI [15]. He lobbied Trump directly and accepted the 15% revenue-sharing arrangement [3][16]. He committed $150 billion per year to Taiwan as the center of AI chip manufacturing [17] while simultaneously denying US policy aims to shift 40% of Taiwan's existing chipmaking capacity to America, framing onshoring as 'all new capacity' that preserves Taiwan's silicon shield [18]. He then accepted an advisory role on Tsinghua University's elite School of Economics and Management board [19], deepening Nvidia's ties with China's elite business and policy networks at the precise moment Washington restricts its most advanced products from China.

Huawei's domestic program has reached a scale and technical depth that validates the 'sanctions backfired' thesis with increasing specificity. Multiple sources project Huawei will capture 50–60% of China's AI chip market in 2026 [20], targeting $12 billion in revenue — a 60% year-on-year jump [21][22] — while doubling Ascend output to 1.6 million dies [23]. Huawei chairman Xu Zhijun has publicly declared US export controls a 'gift' that forced China's semiconductor industry into self-sufficiency [24], and SemiAnalysis reports Huawei's 2026 Kirin chips have achieved 1.5µm bond pitch hybrid bonding — surpassing TSMC's current 6µm by multiple generations, with 2027 chips targeting 1µm pitch [25]. If accurate, this represents a category inversion in a specific packaging technology dimension. SMIC's domestic DUV lithography testing, with reported capability ranging from 28nm to 7nm [26][27], adds a further milestone toward supply chain self-sufficiency.

Chinese technology companies are extending silicon independence beyond chip purchasing into custom design. ByteDance, which holds US H200 licenses while ordering $5.7 billion in Huawei chips [28], is developing its own AI data-center CPUs inspired by Groq's language processing unit architecture, testing both Arm and RISC-V instruction set architectures in parallel [29]. AMD CEO Lisa Su has confirmed China accounts for approximately 20% of AMD revenue [30] and obtained export licenses [31], while SemiAnalysis has identified a human-capital dimension almost entirely absent from the policy debate: AMD and Nvidia's most productive engineers are concentrated in Shanghai [32][33], a talent geography that hardware-focused export control frameworks have not engaged. Taiwan's arms sale remains paused — Trump made no commitment to defend the island at the Beijing summit [34], Taiwan was not officially notified [35] and is actively lobbying for the deal to proceed [36] — while Nvidia's $150 billion per year Taiwan commitment underscores the island's commercial irreplaceability to AI supply chains.

Timeline

  • 2026-01-20: Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei calls Trump's decision to sell advanced AI chips to China 'crazy,' comparing chip sales to 'selling nuclear weapons' and publishing a formal policy argument on DeepSeek and export controls. [38][41][37]
  • 2026-02-10: Anthropic CEO conducts a 'Hill blitz' congressional lobbying campaign to boost a China chip ban. [40]
  • 2026-05-14: The US government clears H200 chip sales to approximately ten Chinese companies including Alibaba, ByteDance, and Tencent. [61][1][2]
  • 2026-05-16: Following Beijing talks with Xi, Trump warns Taiwan against formal independence and reportedly makes no commitment to defend the island. [62][34][63][64]
  • 2026-05-21: Jensen Huang tells CNBC Nvidia has 'largely conceded' China's AI chip market to Huawei; the US Senate unanimously passes the Stop Stealing Our Chips Act. [13][14][8][49][50]
  • 2026-05-22: Huang meets Trump directly; reports emerge of a 15% revenue-sharing deal on China chip sales; Acting Navy Secretary confirms the Taiwan arms sale is paused citing Iran inventory. [16][3][46][44][65][66]
  • 2026-05-23: A Reuters source contradicts the Iran rationale for the Taiwan arms pause; ByteDance is confirmed ordering $5.7B in Huawei chips; AMD confirms ~20% China revenue and export licenses; Huawei 950PR reported to outperform the H20. [45][28][30][31][52]
  • 2026-05-24: Nvidia reports a $4.5B Q1 charge and warns of an $8B Q2 revenue hit; BIS shifts to case-by-case H200/MI325X review; the 15% deal is confirmed not yet finalized; Huawei targets $12B AI chip revenue. [11][67][12][7][6][68]
  • 2026-05-25: Taiwan urges Trump to advance the paused $14B arms deal; Huawei confirms plans to double Ascend output to 1.6 million dies; Huang states blocking Nvidia does not block China from AI. [36][23][15]
  • 2026-05-26: Multiple outlets confirm the 15% revenue-sharing deal structure; SMIC confirms testing domestic DUV lithography with reported capability from 28nm to 7nm; Huawei's 60% revenue jump confirmed. [4][69][5][26][70][27][21][22]
  • 2026-05-27: Nvidia commits $150 billion per year to Taiwan as the center of AI chip manufacturing; Huang denies US policy aims to shift 40% of Taiwan's existing capacity to America, framing onshoring as all new capacity that preserves Taiwan's silicon shield. [17][18]
  • 2026-05-28: Huang accepts an advisory role on Tsinghua University's SEM board, deepening Nvidia's ties with China's elite business and policy networks. [19]
  • 2026-05-29: SemiAnalysis reports AMD and Nvidia's most productive engineers are concentrated in Shanghai; Intel's Taiwan-free Xeon supply chain noted as a counter-example to Taiwan-dependency assumptions. [32][33][59]
  • 2026-05-30: Huawei chairman Xu Zhijun publicly thanks the US for export controls as a 'gift' that built China's semiconductor self-sufficiency; ByteDance confirms developing its own AI data-center CPUs testing Arm and RISC-V architectures. [24][29]
  • 2026-05-31: SemiAnalysis reports Huawei's 2026 Kirin chips achieve 1.5µm bond pitch hybrid bonding — ahead of TSMC's 6µm by multiple generations — framing it as a sanctions-driven breakthrough, with 2027 chips targeting 1µm. [25]

Perspectives

Jensen Huang / Nvidia

Controls have backfired commercially: Nvidia has 'largely conceded' China's AI chip market to Huawei [13][14], blocking Nvidia does not block China from AI [15], and facing a $4.5B Q1 charge [11], Huang accepted the 15% revenue-sharing deal and lobbied Trump directly [3][16].

Evolution: Huang denied US policy aims to shift 40% of Taiwan's existing chipmaking to America, framing his $150B commitment as additive capacity that preserves Taiwan's silicon shield [18][17]; his Tsinghua SEM board membership [19] deepens his contradictions across geopolitical boundaries simultaneously.

[13][14][11][12][16][3][15][17][19][18]

Dario Amodei / Anthropic

Strongly opposed to US chip exports to China: called Trump's reversal 'crazy' [37], compared chip sales to 'selling nuclear weapons' [38], argued chips are 'the only advantage we have' over China [39], and conducted a congressional 'Hill blitz' [40].

Evolution: Consistent. Represents the most prominent AI model company voice directly opposing the semiconductor companies, lobbying Congress while Nvidia and AMD lobby the White House.

[38][41][39][37][40]

AMD / Lisa Su

China accounts for ~20% of AMD revenue [30], AMD holds export licenses [31], and Su has warned against strict controls [42].

Evolution: Consistent. SemiAnalysis's report that AMD's top engineering teams are in Shanghai [32] adds an unremarked structural dimension to AMD's China entanglement.

[43][42][30][31][32]

Trump administration / BIS

Approved licensed H200 sales to ten Chinese firms [1][2], adopted BIS case-by-case review for H200 and MI325X [7], and structured a 15% revenue-sharing deal under which Nvidia and AMD remit a portion of China chip sales to the US government [3][4][5]. Confirmed the Taiwan arms sale pause with a disputed rationale [44][45].

Evolution: Consistent. The 15% deal is confirmed by multiple outlets [4][5] but finalization remains pending [6].

[3][46][6][7][44][45][4][5]

US Senate and Congress (bipartisan)

Senate unanimously passed the Stop Stealing Our Chips Act creating 10–30% whistleblower bounties [8]; the bipartisan MATCH Act was introduced in both chambers [9][47]; chipmaking equipment controls and House Foreign Affairs markup advanced [10][48].

Evolution: Consistent. Congressional enforcement activity spans both chambers across multiple vehicles simultaneously, operating in direct tension with executive branch licensing approvals.

[8][49][50][48][10][9][51][47]

Huawei / Chinese tech ecosystem

Projecting 50–60% of China's AI chip market in 2026 [20] with $12B revenue reflecting 60% year-on-year growth [21][22], doubling Ascend output to 1.6 million dies [23]; ByteDance holds H200 licenses while ordering $5.7B in Huawei chips [28] and developing custom CPUs [29].

Evolution: Chairman Xu Zhijun publicly credited US sanctions as a 'gift' that built China's semiconductor self-sufficiency [24]; SemiAnalysis reports Huawei's 2026 Kirin achieves 1.5µm hybrid bonding ahead of TSMC's 6µm [25], providing a concrete technical metric supporting the chairman's rhetoric.

[20][21][22][23][52][28][26][27][29][24][25]

Taiwan government

President Lai insists Taiwan's future will not be decided by external forces [53]; Taiwan was not officially notified of the arms sale pause [35] and is actively lobbying for the deal to proceed [36] while fearing the pause weakens its defenses [54].

Evolution: Consistent. Nvidia's $150B/year Taiwan commitment [17] and Huang's denial that US policy aims to shift existing Taiwan capacity [18] add commercial framing to the island's geopolitical exposure.

[53][35][55][54][36][17][18]

CFR / Brookings / SemiAnalysis (analytical voices)

CFR: Trump's AI chip policy is 'strategically incoherent and unenforceable' [56] but Huawei cannot catch Nvidia [57]. Brookings: Trump's Taiwan approach is a 'dangerous gamble' [58]. SemiAnalysis: AMD and Nvidia's best engineers are in Shanghai [32]; Intel's Taiwan-free Xeon supply chain challenges Taiwan-dependency assumptions [59]; Huawei's 2026 Kirin achieves world-leading 1.5µm hybrid bonding [25].

Evolution: SemiAnalysis's hybrid bonding report [25] puts CFR's 'Huawei cannot catch Nvidia' claim under direct technical pressure, though the claims concern different dimensions — chip performance versus packaging technology.

[56][57][58][60][32][59][25]

Tensions

  • Dario Amodei / Anthropic vs. Jensen Huang / Nvidia on chip exports: Amodei conducts an active congressional lobbying campaign against chip sales — calling Trump's reversal 'crazy' and comparing it to 'selling nuclear weapons' [38][37][40] — while Huang lobbies the White House for relaxation and AMD's Su obtained export licenses [16][31]. [38][37][40][16][31]
  • Trump administration vs. Congress: the White House approved licensed H200 sales and structured a 15% revenue-sharing deal [3][5] while the Senate unanimously passed whistleblower enforcement legislation [8] and the House advances multiple enforcement bills [48][10] — with the same president being lobbied by Nvidia for further relaxation [16]. [3][5][8][48][10][16]
  • Huang vs. CFR on Huawei chip capability: Huang says Huawei chips are 'comparable' to the H200 and Nvidia has 'largely conceded' China's market [13][14][15], while CFR argues Huawei cannot catch Nvidia [57]; SemiAnalysis's hybrid bonding report [25] sharpens this dispute across both chip performance and packaging technology dimensions. [13][14][57][15][21][22][20][25]
  • Nvidia's $150B Taiwan commitment vs. Trump's US manufacturing push: Huang committed $150 billion per year to Taiwan manufacturing [17] while denying US policy aims to shift 40% of existing Taiwan capacity to America [18] — a reframing that partially defuses one contradiction while adding a new claim about US policy intentions. [17][18]
  • Huang accepting Tsinghua advisory board vs. Washington's chip restrictions: Huang joined Tsinghua SEM's 65-member advisory board [19] while simultaneously holding a 15% revenue-sharing deal with the US government [3] — a juxtaposition that has drawn no reported regulatory response. [19][3]
  • US export control strategy vs. Huawei's acceleration: the framework assumes denying advanced chips retards Chinese AI capability, but Huawei's chairman publicly credits US sanctions for building China's semiconductor self-sufficiency [24], SemiAnalysis reports Huawei has achieved world-leading hybrid bonding technology ahead of TSMC [25], and Huawei is projecting 50–60% of China's AI chip market [20] as ByteDance builds custom CPUs [29]. [24][25][20][29]

Sources

  1. [1] The US Commerce Department has approved around 10 Chinese ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  2. [2] China gives nod to ByteDance, Alibaba and Tencent to buy Nvidia's ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  3. [3] Nvidia and AMD to pay 15% of China chip sales to US - BBC — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  4. [4] Inside the U.S. Government’s Bold Revenue-Sharing Deal With Chipmakers Nvidia & AMD - Z2Data — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  5. [5] U.S. Government to Take Cut of Nvidia and AMD A.I. Chip Sales to ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  6. [6] Nvidia still hasn't finalized deal to kick 15% of H20 China chip sales ... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  7. [7] BIS Export Policy Shift | Introl Blog — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  8. [8] Senate Unanimously Passes Stop Stealing Our Chips Act - Digg — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  9. [9] [2026-04-08] Risch, Ricketts, Kim Introduce MATCH Act; Level the... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  10. [10] Baumgartner Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Tighten Controls on ... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  11. [11] Nvidia takes $4.5bn hit due to export restrictions | Computer Weekly — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  12. [12] Nvidia beats on Q1 revenue, warns of $8 billion sales hit in Q2 from ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  13. [13] Nvidia CEO says that Huawei's chip is comparable to Nvidia's H200. : r/LocalLLaMA — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  14. [14] Nvidia says it has 'largely conceded' China's AI chip market to Huawei — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  15. [15] Jensen Huang explains how blocking China from Nvidia does not mean blocking China from AI. — Rohan Paul Twitter (2026-05-25)
  16. [16] Nvidia CEO meets with Trump, talks export controls - The Hill — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  17. [17] Nvidia bets $150B on Taiwan as Trump's plan to make US an AI hub backfires — Ars Technica AI (2026-05-27)
  18. [18] Nvidia CEO denies that US wants to shift 40% of Taiwan's chipmaking capacity to America — Jensen Huang says onshoring is all new capacity, will preserve island nation's silicon shield | Tom's Hardware — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  19. [19] Jensen Huang just moved Nvidia closer to China’s elite business and policy network by accepting the coveted Tsinghua Uni… — Rohan Paul Twitter (2026-05-28)
  20. [20] Huawei Is The Biggest Winner In China's AI Market After NVIDIA Pullout, AI Share To Reach 60% This Year — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  21. [21] Huawei expects AI chip revenue to jump at least 60% this year, FT reports — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  22. [22] Huawei expects AI chip sales to surge at least 60% in 2026: report — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  23. [23] Huawei to double AI chip output in 2026, targeting 1.6 million dies — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  24. [24] 🇺🇸🇨🇳Huawei’s chairman just turned U.S. chip controls into a victory speech for China’s semiconductor rise. — Rohan Paul Twitter (2026-05-30)
  25. [25] Necessity is the mother of innovation. — SemiAnalysis Twitter (2026-05-31)
  26. [26] China Tests Domestic DUV Lithography Machine for 28nm Chips — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  27. [27] China's SMIC Begins Trial Operation of 7nm DUV Equipment ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  28. [28] ByteDance to order $5.7 billion Huawei AI chips over Nvidia in 2026 — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  29. [29] Reuter: ByteDance is building its own AI data-center CPUs because running agents at TikTok scale now depends on scarce s… — Rohan Paul Twitter (2026-05-30)
  30. [30] AMD CEO Lisa Su says China still accounts for about 20 ... - Reddit — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  31. [31] #TECH: AMD CEO Lisa Su confirmed Thursday that the ... - Facebook — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  32. [32] Most of AMD and NVIDIA’s best 10x engineers are in Shanghai. AMD’s MoRI collective team, AMD’s disaggregated application… — SemiAnalysis Twitter (2026-05-29)
  33. [33] The most of AMD & NVIDIA's best 10x AMD engineers are in Shanghai. AMD's MoRI collective team, AMD disagg applicatio… — SemiAnalysis Twitter (2026-05-29)
  34. [34] Trump's "no commitment" on Taiwan post-China redefines strategic ambiguity as a transactional lever. This immediately re... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics (2026-05-16)
  35. [35] Taiwan says US hasn't notified it of any pause in arms sale - AP News — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  36. [36] Taiwan urges Trump to advance arms deal after China summit — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  37. [37] Anthropic boss Dario Amodei slams Trump over 'crazy' decision to ... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  38. [38] Trump Just Reversed an AI Chip Ban for China—and a Key Tech Leader Says It’s Like ‘Selling Nuclear Weapons’ — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  39. [39] Chips may be 'only advantage we have' over China, Amodei says — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  40. [40] Anthropic CEO's Hill blitz boosts China chip ban - Axios — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  41. [41] Dario Amodei — On DeepSeek and Export Controls — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  42. [42] AMD CEO Lisa Su warns against strict U.S. chip controls — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  43. [43] AMD CEO Making Progress with US on China Export Restrictions (Full Interview) — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  44. [44] US pausing $14B arms sale to Taiwan due to Iran war: Acting Navy secretary — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  45. [45] US arms sales to Taiwan unrelated to Iran war, source says | Reuters — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  46. [46] Nvidia, AMD to Give U.S. 15% Cut on AI Chip Sales to China - WSJ — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  47. [47] Senators Kim and Ricketts Introduce MATCH Act to Level the Global Playing Field for U.S. Tech - Senator Andy Kim — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  48. [48] Support Export Control Legislation at HFAC Markup (April 22) — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  49. [49] US Senate passes Stop Stealing our Chips Act to curb semiconductor smuggling to China — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics (2026-05-23)
  50. [50] RT @AIpolicynetwork: The Senate unanimously passed the Stop Stealing Our Chips Act last night. Thank you @MarkWarner and... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics (2026-05-22)
  51. [51] House Committee Passes Legislation Protecting American ... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  52. [52] Huawei's Ascend 950PR outperforms Nvidia's H20 in China — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  53. [53] 🇹🇼 Taiwan's President Lai: 'Future will NOT be decided by external forces' — amid China-US headwinds — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics (2026-05-20)
  54. [54] Taiwan fears a US pause on a $14bn arms package could ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  55. [55] Eager for Arms Deal, Taiwan Stresses Need for U.S. Support — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  56. [56] The New AI Chip Export Policy to China: Strategically Incoherent ... — reactive:us-china-chip-export-debate
  57. [57] China's AI Chip Deficit: Why Huawei Can't Catch Nvidia and U.S. ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  58. [58] Trump's dangerous Taiwan gamble | Brookings — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  59. [59] Chip supply chain talk defaults to Taiwan. Intel runs an entire parallel chain that never touches the island. — SemiAnalysis Twitter (2026-05-29)
  60. [60] DeepSeek shows the limits of US export controls on AI chips | Brookings — reactive:ai-chip-geopolitics
  61. [61] US clears H200 chip sales to 10 China firms as Nvidia CEO looks for ... — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  62. [62] Trump warns Taiwan against formal independence after talks with Xi in Beijing. — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics (2026-05-16)
  63. [63] Trump weighs Taiwan arms sale after China summit — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  64. [64] Trump Makes a High Risk Move to Win Over Xi — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  65. [65] US pauses Taiwan weapons sales to ensure munitions readiness for Iran | Fox News — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  66. [66] Acting Navy secretary: Taiwan weapons sales paused to ... - The Hill — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  67. [67] NVIDIA Posts $4.5B Q1 Charge Over US Export Restrictions — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  68. [68] Huawei expects AI chip revenue to jump at least 60% this year, FT reports — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  69. [69] Nvidia and AMD agree to give U.S. 15% of revenue from ... - YouTube — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics
  70. [70] SMIC initiates testing of domestically produced lithography machines to bypass US sanctions — reactive:chip-export-china-geopolitics